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Abstract
The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity
of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological
objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S.
Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared sci-
entific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors
is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded,
hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account
of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are
reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem
remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the
relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological
norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be
exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.
Keywords: scientific realism, objectivity, theory-choice, values,
method
1 Introduction
In this paper, I propose a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of
science. Baldly stated, epistemic objectivity arises from the adoption of
norms which promote truth about the objective world. Epistemic objec-
tivity is explained in reliabilist terms as compliance with truth-conducive
epistemic norms. To the extent that the scientist must deliberate on the
application of competing epistemic norms, the account draws on the re-
sources of virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is not to defend a
realist account of objectivity against anti-realist accounts of objectivity.
The aim of the paper is to develop an account of epistemic objectivity
that is suited to a realist conception of scientific inquiry.
It is not my intention to argue for scientific realism here. Still, it is
important to set the stage by indicating the nature of the realist con-
ception of science that lies behind my approach to objectivity. I take
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scientific realism in the first instance as a view about the aim of science.
The aim of science is to discover the truth about the world, and progress
in science consists in progress toward that aim. The world that science
investigates is an objective reality that exists independently of human
thought. Like reality itself, truth is also objective. Truth is a correspon-
dence relation between claims about the world and the way the world
is. Most importantly, science is not restricted to empirical claims of an
observational nature. Science is strongly theoretical. Scientific theories
make substantive assertions about the nature of unobservable theoret-
ical entities. Observed phenomena are often explained in terms of the
behavior of theoretical entities whose existence is postulated for such
explanatory purposes. Well-established theories are to be accepted as
true or approximately true explanations of the world that apply to both
observable and unobservable aspects of reality.1
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section (2) notes the ambiguity
of the notion of objectivity and indicates how the notion of epistemic ob-
jectivity broadly relates to two other main notions of objectivity. Section
(3) introduces the topic by way of T.S. Kuhn’s discussion of subjectiv-
ity and objectivity in the context of multiple scientific values. Section
(4) argues that Kuhn’s discussion provides at most a minimal sense of
objectivity on which the values play a neutral role, though their rela-
tion to truth is left unaccounted for. Section (5) introduces a robust
sense of epistemic objectivity on which a belief is epistemically justified
in an objective sense if it is based on a truth-conducive methodological
norm. Section (6) notes a shortcoming with both forms of epistemic ob-
jectivity due to the potential conflict between competing norms, and the
resulting need for subjective judgement with respect to the application of
methodological norms. Section (7) explores the way in which judgement
between competing norms may involve the exercise of cognitive virtues
which import objective elements into the subjective sphere. Section (8)
summarizes the discussion and raises questions for future work.
2 Objectivity
What is objectivity, and how is it exemplified by the sciences? The
notion of objectivity is subject to a certain ambiguity. I distinguish
three primary notions of objectivity applicable to the sciences: (i) an
ontological sense of objectivity relating to the mind-independence of the
natural world; (ii) a semantic form of objectivity relating to the nature of
truth; (iii) an epistemic notion of objectivity relating to methodological
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norms and the epistemic justification of beliefs and theories licensed
by those norms. Though distinct, I suggest that the three forms of
objectivity have a certain interdependence.2
The first notion of objectivity is the idea that the world exists in its
own right. The way the world is does not depend on us. Nor does it de-
pend on the way we think it is. Reality is independent of human thought
and experience. Its existence, nature and structure are independent of
human thought, language, conceptual activity and perceptual experi-
ence. The world in itself, independent of all human contribution, is
objective reality. As for its role in science, objective reality provides the
subject-matter. It constitutes the object of study for scientific investi-
gation. When scientists conduct research, their aim is to determine the
nature of the objective reality that they investigate. The aim of science
is to discover the nature of objective reality itself.3
The second notion of objectivity relates to truth. Truth is objective
in the sense that it does not depend on what we believe. It depends on
the way the world is. A true belief gets the world right. The truth need
not be how we believe or wish the world to be. It has nothing to do with
what we believe and everything to do with how the world is. The way
the world is does not depend on what we believe or even what we are
justified in believing. Not only may belief be false, but justified belief
may be false. Moreover, a proposition does not need to be believed for it
to be true (or false). A proposition that nobody believes, and for which
nobody has any evidence, may nevertheless be true.
The dependence of truth on reality brings the objectivity of truth
into relation with ontological objectivity. As the realist understands this
dependence, truth is a correspondence relation which obtains between a
belief or proposition and a fact or state of affairs. A proposition is true
if and only if it corresponds to an objectively existing state of affairs,
whether or not we believe that the state of affairs exists. Truth is ob-
jective because it consists in correspondence to objective reality. It is
because objective reality is a certain way that a proposition is true. The
world being objectively that way is what makes the proposition true.4
The third notion of objectivity is an epistemic one. The epistemic
notion of objectivity has a close connection with the idea of a scien-
tific method. Science is characterized by the employment of a special
method which distinguishes it from non-science and pseudo-science. For
present purposes, this special method may be understood either in tra-
ditional terms as a single method or in more contemporary terms as a
set of norms and procedures broadly constitutive of the methodology
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of science.5 Use of the method guarantees that subjective factors, such
as bias, personal interest and political orientation, are excluded from
scientific research. It ensures that the only factors considered in scien-
tific inquiry are epistemically relevant factors (e.g. empirical evidence)
which contribute to the search for scientific knowledge. As such, use of
the scientific method promotes the epistemic objectivity of science by
excluding subjective factors in favour of epistemically relevant factors.
As a result of its objective nature, scientific inquiry is characterized by
widespread consensus among scientists. Disagreement, where it occurs,
is short-lived. The reason that science is characterized by consensus is
precisely due to epistemic objectivity and the role played by the scien-
tific method in ensuring such objectivity. It is because scientists employ
a shared scientific method that they come to agree with each other.
The shared scientific method ensures epistemic objectivity, and thereby
promotes the formation of consensus among scientists.
I have distinguished three forms of objectivity: ontological objectiv-
ity, the objectivity of truth and epistemic objectivity. I have indicated
how the objectivity of truth may be seen to have a certain dependence,
via correspondence, on ontological objectivity. Let us now ask how epis-
temic objectivity is related to the other two notions. Here is the way
I think that the matter stands. The reason that we value and indeed
should seek to ensure and maintain epistemically objective methods is
precisely in virtue of the relationship that this form of objectivity bears
to the other forms of objectivity. It is because we employ methods of
scientific inquiry which function to exclude subjective factors and to in-
corporate only genuinely epistemic factors that the results and theories
of the sciences should be accepted. They should be accepted because
by employing such methods we have the best chance of arriving at true
beliefs about the nature of reality. In short, it is the epistemic objectiv-
ity of the methods of science that leads to the objective truth about the
objective world.
3 T.S. Kuhn on scientific values and objectivity
In this section, I turn specifically to the question of the epistemic objec-
tivity of science. To introduce the topic, I provide a brief overview of
T.S. Kuhn’s well-known treatment of subjective and objective factors in
relation to the norms of scientific methodology.
Kuhn’s famous book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was
met by a negative critical reaction due to the relativistic and irrational-
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ist implications of the account of scientific theory-change the book pro-
posed. In a number of publications dating from the early 1970’s, Kuhn
sought to dispel the impression of relativism and irrationalism which
surrounded his account of theory-change.6 In particular, in his paper
‘Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice’, Kuhn claims that
there is a stable core of scientific values found throughout much of the
history of science.7 These values provide an objective basis for scien-
tific theory-choice, though subjective factors enter into the individual
scientist’s understanding and application of the values.
As described in Structure, the choice that scientists make in revolu-
tionary transition between paradigms is unable to be made on the basis
of a shared set of methodological standards. Paradigms are incommensu-
rable, due in part to a lack of shared standards, as well as being directed
to disjoint sets of problems.8 Kuhn presents a modified view of the
matter in ‘Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice’.9 Rather
than deny the existence of shared methodological standards, Kuhn holds
that there is a set of methodological criteria which scientists employ in
the appraisal of scientific theories and in the resulting choice of theory
that they make. The criteria function as values which guide and inform
theory-choice, rather than as rules which dictate the choice. Kuhn does
not undertake to provide an exhaustive list of the values. But he does list
accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness as being among
the most prominent values actually embraced by scientists.10 The dis-
tinction between rules and values is important for some purposes. But
it is not of crucial significance here. So, in what follows I gloss over it.
Except where specifically discussing what Kuhn says about values, I will
tend to employ the more general term ‘norm’ to refer to the criteria or
standards which Kuhn describes as values, as well as to any criteria or
standards that might be regarded as rules.
As opposed to the view that seemed to be presented in Structure, on
Kuhn’s modified view scientists choose between theories or paradigms on
the basis of shared methodological norms. Indeed, Kuhn describes the
values as “the shared basis for theory choice” [10, p.322]. What remains
of the apparent relativism of the original view is the idea that the set of
values which informs scientists’ choice of theory fails to uniquely deter-
mine that choice. Scientists who employ the same set of values in the
appraisal and choice of theory need not reach the same decision. Kuhn
explains that there are two main reasons for the lack of a unique out-
come. First, the values themselves are imprecise, so that scientists may
differ in their interpretation and application of an individual value. Sec-
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ondly, it is possible for the values to conflict with each other; “accuracy
may, for example, dictate the choice of one theory, scope the choice of its
competitor” [10, p.322]. As a result of the imprecision of individual val-
ues and the potential conflict between them, scientists who appeal to the
shared set of values may nevertheless come to different decisions based
on the shared values. As Kuhn expressed the point elsewhere, “there is
no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure
which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the
same decision” [13, p.198].
Because the shared scientific values fail to uniquely determine choice
of theory, Kuhn holds that both subjective and objective factors con-
tribute to individual choice of theory. On the one hand, the shared values
constitute objective factors which scientists take into account in choice of
theory. On the other hand, individual scientists vary with respect to the
interpretation and weight which they attach to the shared values. As a
result of such individual variation in application and weighting of shared
values, subjective elements enter into an individual scientist’s choice of
theory. Kuhn is at pains to insist, however, that such subjective fac-
tors do not make theory-choice an inscrutable matter of personal taste.
To say that an individual scientist’s choice of theory involves subjective
elements is not to say that no discussion of the matter is possible: ‘If
my critics introduce the term “subjective” in a sense that opposes it to
judgmental—thus suggesting that I make theory choice undiscussable, a
matter of taste—they have seriously mistaken my position’ [10, p.337].
For Kuhn, the subjective elements of theory-choice left undetermined by
the values are not exempt from challenge. So far from being a brute
matter of personal taste, the subjective elements are themselves open to
discussion. Indeed, to be taken seriously as a scientist, a scientist must
be able and willing “to exhibit the bases for their judgments” [10, p.337].
In the next two sections (4 and 5), I explore the extent to which
epistemic norms such as Kuhn’s values provide an objective basis for
epistemic justification and theory-choice. I return to the role purportedly
played by subjective factors in the section that follows (6).
4 Minimal objectivity
In this section, I consider the sense in which the scientific values identified
by Kuhn provide an objective basis for theory-choice. The values reflect
features of theories which are outside the minds of individual scientists.
As such, they are able to play a neutral role in theory-appraisal. But
Howard Sankey: Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science 7
Kuhn provides no epistemological grounding for the values. Hence, I
suggest, the values are objective in a minimal sense of objectivity.
For Kuhn, theory-choice is conducted on the basis of the shared val-
ues which constitute criteria of theory appraisal. In choosing between
alternative theories, a scientist considers the extent to which the theo-
ries satisfy the values. Because alternative theories may all satisfy the
values in various ways, and to varying degrees, the scientist must make
a decision as to which values are to be accorded greater significance for
the decision at hand. This is where Kuhn takes there to be individual
variation between scientists, due to the fact that the values are unable
to fully determine theory-choice. But we may set that point aside until
we return to it in section (6). The point of present relevance is that, in
choice of theory, the scientist appeals to a set of values which provides
the basis for the choice. For example, a scientist may choose a theory
because they take the theory to be simpler and more accurate than al-
ternative theories. In such a case, the values of simplicity and accuracy
provide the basis for the scientist’s choice.
There is a sense in which the values to which a scientist appeals in
choice of theory constitute an objective basis for theory-choice. The
values to which the scientist appeals are independent of the scientist.
They are outside the mind of the individual scientist. The values reflect
features of theories which the theories possess independent of the scien-
tist. For example, if a theory satisfies the value of accuracy, this means
that the theory possesses the property of being accurate. Because of the
independence of the value from the scientist, the value provides a basis
for the scientist’s choice of theory which is outside the mind of the sci-
entist. The scientist’s choice of theory is not therefore an unconstrained
subjective mental state. It has an objective basis because it is based on
something outside the mind of the scientist.11
But while there is a sense in which the values provide an objective
basis for theory-choice, it is at best a minimal sense of objectivity. To see
this, it is important to recognize that Kuhn provides no epistemological
grounding for the values. He takes there to be a difference between
scientific values and values such as social utility [10, p.331]. But he
provides no explanation of how or why adherence to the values in the
context of scientific inquiry leads to truth or knowledge. At one point,
Kuhn appears to suggest that to provide such an account would require
a solution to the problem of induction, something which he is unable to
provide [10, pp.332-3].12 The result is that, while the independence of the
values enables them to play an objective role, no substantive account has
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been given by Kuhn of the epistemic role of the values. Nothing has been
done to show that they have anything to do with truth or knowledge.13
Given the absence of an epistemological ground for the values, the
sense of objectivity which the values provide is a minimal sense at best.
The values are objective in the sense of lying outside the mind of the
individual scientist. But because the values have not been shown to have
an epistemic role by leading to truth or knowledge, Kuhn’s account of
objectivity in terms of shared scientific values fails to provide a robust
sense of epistemic objectivity. For the values to provide a robust form
of epistemic objectivity they must have a substantive connection with
truth or knowledge. The objectivity at issue could hardly be epistemic
objectivity without a connection to truth or knowledge.
5 Robust objectivity
In the previous section, I have argued that Kuhn’s scientific values
give rise to a minimal sense of objectivity. Without an epistemologi-
cal grounding, they fail to provide the basis for a substantive notion
of epistemic objectivity. The question now is whether a more robust
account of objectivity may be found.
My aim in this section is to define a more substantive conception of
epistemic objectivity than the minimal sense considered in the previous
section. What I wish to propose is that methodological norms such as
Kuhn’s values are themselves able to possess objective epistemic warrant.
If a scientist accepts a theory because the theory satisfies warranted
methodological norms, the scientist’s acceptance of the theory is itself
thereby warranted. The scientist’s acceptance of the theory has objective
epistemic justification because the theory satisfies the methodological
norms.
To explain the objective basis of justified theory acceptance, I draw
upon the resources of reliabilist epistemology. The reliabilist theory of
the warrant of methodological norms that I adopt is a modified version
of Laudan’s normative naturalism [15] which I have developed in earlier
papers (especially [21, 22]). Unlike Laudan, I place the normative nat-
uralist metamethodology in a scientific realist context by arguing that
truth is an aim of science that may be rationally pursued. Once norma-
tive naturalism is placed within a realist context it is transformed into a
kind of method reliabilism because the methodological norms of science
are conceived as a reliable means of arriving at the truth.14
The reliabilist theory of epistemic justification enables an explicit
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connection to be made between justification and truth. For a method-
ological norm to convey epistemic warrant, use of the norm must lead
reliably to truth. Methodological norms are conceived in instrumental
fashion as tools of inquiry.15 They are means for the realization of the
epistemic aim of truth. The relation between epistemic means and ends
is not an analytic or conceptual relation that may be known in an a
priori manner. It is a contingent synthetic relation that is subject to a
posteriori investigation. Conceiving methodological norms in this way
enables the question of whether a norm is warranted to be understood as
the empirical question of whether use of the norm leads to the epistemic
aims it is meant to promote. Methodological norms are to be evaluated
empirically to determine whether their use leads to truth.
It is not possible to directly observe that use of methodological norms
leads to truth at the level of theoretical claims about unobservable enti-
ties. The truth of the non-observational content of theories is unable to
be determined by direct observation. This is the basis for Laudan’s anti-
realist version of normative naturalism ([15, p.30, fn.19]; cf. [14, p.53]).
As against Laudan, I employ an inference to the best explanation at the
metamethodological level to the effect that the best explanation of the
role played by methodological norms in the production of successful sci-
entific theories is that they constitute truth-conducive tools of inquiry.
This approach employs a metamethodological analogue of the classic ‘no
miracles’ argument for scientific realism. To put it concisely, it would
be a miracle for a theory to satisfy a range of methodological norms to
a high degree and yet be completely mistaken (for detailed development
of my approach, see ([21, pp.224-5]; [22, pp.75-8]; [23, pp.69-72]).
The reliabilist approach to the warrant of methodological norms that
I have just outlined enables us to conceive of epistemic objectivity in a
more substantive sense than the minimal sense considered in the pre-
vious section. It is a more substantive sense of epistemic objectivity
because it is grounded in factual relations between method and truth.
If a methodological norm is in fact genuinely truth-conducive, there is a
sense in which belief licensed by the norm is objectively warranted. For
it is an objective matter of fact that use of the norm actually does lead to
truth. The objective connection between the norm and truth gives rise
to an objective sense of epistemic warrant. A belief is epistemically jus-
tified in an objective sense if it is based on a norm that in fact conduces
to truth.
In sum, the reliabilist analysis of the warrant of methodological norms
provides the basis for a robust sense of epistemic objectivity. The ob-
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jectivity provided by reliably truth-conducive methodological norms is
not just objectivity in the minimal sense that the norms are indepen-
dent of the mental states of individual scientists. It is stronger than
that. The epistemic justification provided by the methodological norms
derives from the fact that there is a reliable connection between use of
the norms and the truth. Because there is a real fact of the matter about
the truth-conducive character of the norms, there is a robust sense in
which the epistemic justification provided by the norms is objective. It
is objective in a robust sense precisely in virtue of the objective fact that
the methodological norms really do promote truth. The norms are not
just independent of an individual scientist’s thought processes. They are
grounded in objective facts about the relationship between method and
truth.16
6 Subjective elements
In section (3), we saw that Kuhn took scientific theory-choice to involve
subjective elements not determined by the shared scientific values. Given
the imprecision of the values and the potential for conflict between them,
there is scope for individual variation in the interpretation and weighting
of the values. In this section, I return to that issue.
On the assumption that science is not governed by a single fixed
method, a pluralistic approach to the methodology of science may be
adopted. On such a conception, scientists adhere to a variety of method-
ological norms. These norms vary in specificity and abstractness. The
norms range from low-level rules applying to the use of specific instru-
ments in laboratory settings, to general principles of experimental de-
sign, to over-arching accounts of the relationship between theory and
evidence, and criteria of theory-appraisal of the kind described by Kuhn.
On such a pluralist conception of methodology, there may be variation of
methodological norms between various branches of science, and, indeed,
throughout the history of science.17
On such a pluralist conception, the methodology of science is consti-
tuted by a range of methodological norms that scientists employ in the
practice of science. While it may be possible to rank-order the norms
for specific purposes in specific contexts, it seems unlikely that they can
be set into a fixed or universally applicable ordering. Moreover, it seems
unlikely that the norms can be codified in a way that yields a mechanical
decision procedure which might lead all scientists to arrive at exactly the
same choice of theory. In light of these points, Kuhn’s claim that there
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is no algorithm for theory-choice seems entirely plausible.
On the assumption that there is no algorithm of theory-choice, it
seems clear that a role must be played by deliberative judgement in
the choice between theories. Even if the norms of scientific method
are objective in both the minimal and the robust senses identified in
the previous two sections, the individual scientist must still arrive at a
judgement as to which norms to treat as relevant and most significant.
The role of individual judgement raises the possibility that an element
of subjectivity is involved in the decision-making process in much the
way that Kuhn suggested.
In sum, if Kuhn is right, objective methodological considerations
leave scope for subjective elements to enter scientific decision-making.
Individual scientists must decide upon the relevance and relative signifi-
cance of a range of methodological considerations. Despite the existence
of objective methodological norms, an individual scientist must engage in
a process of deliberation in arriving at a judgement of the relative weight-
ing and merits of diverse methodological considerations. The question
is what is to be said about the nature of such judgement.
7 A role for virtue
In the previous section, we saw that a necessary role is played by de-
liberative judgement in deciding how to weight and apply a range of
methodological norms. As Kuhn suggested, the need for such judge-
ment imports a subjective element into theory-choice that is not deter-
mined by the objective norms. It is important to bear in mind Kuhn’s
insistence that the role played by subjective elements does not render
theory-choice a matter of inscrutable personal taste. The subjective el-
ements of a scientist’s decision are open to critical discussion. Indeed,
it seems clear that, for Kuhn, rational considerations play a crucial role
in the subjective elements of the decision that are left undetermined by
the objective norms.
Kuhn did not develop an account of the nature of the judgement
involved in scientists’ deliberations concerning the significance and rela-
tive weight of the scientific values.18 But it is possible to say something
positive about the nature of such judgement by drawing on the resources
of recent virtue epistemology. Though this possibility has yet to attract
attention in relation to Kuhn’s ideas about theory-choice, relevant dis-
cussion has occurred in relation to Pierre Duhem’s idea of “good sense”,
beginning with a seminal article by David Stump [25].19
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The basic idea is that, in addition to the two forms of epistemic ob-
jectivity canvassed so far, there is a third notion of objectivity that may
be distinguished. This form of objectivity is located within the process of
deliberative judgement that Kuhn described as being subjective. More
specifically, the idea is that there is a range of cognitive virtues that
may be exercised by a scientist in the process of forming a judgement.
The judgement involved in weighing up and applying the methodological
norms in the context of theory-choice may itself be a virtuous process
in the sense that the virtues are appropriately employed in the course
of forming the judgement. Virtuous judgement can itself be objective
because the cognitive virtues themselves embody and manifest a form of
cognitive objectivity.
What are the virtues, and how do they perform this role? It would
take us too far afield to survey all the cognitive virtues or versions of
virtue epistemology to be found in the literature. I confine myself, there-
fore, to the virtue highlighted in Stump’s discussion of Duhem. Stump
places considerable emphasis on “the image of the scientist as impartial
judge” [25, p.151]. The need for a scientist to deliberate in an impartial
manner requires that the scientist adopt a certain attitude of detach-
ment. As Duhem himself writes:
“[. . . ] nothing contributes more to entangle good sense and
to disturb its insight than passions and interests. There-
fore, nothing will delay the decision which should determine
a fortunate reform in a physical theory more than the van-
ity which makes a physicist too indulgent towards his own
system and too severe toward the system of another. We
are thus led to the conclusion so clearly expressed by Claude
Bernard: The sound experimental criticism of a hypothesis
is subordinated to certain moral conditions; in order to esti-
mate correctly the agreement of a physical theory with the
facts, it is not enough to be a good mathematician and skill-
ful experimenter; one must also be an impartial and faithful
judge.” [3, p.218]
As can be seen here, Duhem cautions against falling into the grip of
“passions and interests”, as well as the “vanity” of being “indulgent”
towards one’s own theory while being overly critical of theories held by
others. Though it consists of a number of elements, the primary virtue at
issue here is the virtue of impartiality. If a scientist exercises the virtue
of impartiality, they form a judgement in a neutral and detached way
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that is free from bias and not unduly committed to their own favoured
theory.
How is the virtue of impartiality to be brought to bear on the problem
of judging the relative significance and applicability of multiple method-
ological norms? One key role played by impartiality is to ensure that
appropriate methodological considerations are recognized and correctly
applied. If a theory is in fact supported by relevant empirical evidence,
the impartial judge will both recognize the existence of the evidence and
accord due weight to that evidence whether or not the theory is their
preferred theory. Equally, where competing theories differentially satisfy
the same norms, the impartial judge will recognize the respects in which
the theories satisfy the norms. Where it is possible to make a decision in
light of this assessment, the impartial scientist will arrive at a judicious
determination of which theory is to be favoured on balance, if one theory
is indeed to be favoured on balance.
The virtue of impartiality provides a sense in which objectivity
may obtain within the sphere that Kuhn describes as subjective. No
doubt, further cognitive virtues (e.g. humility, intellectual honesty, even-
handedness) remain to be explored which will enable this notion of objec-
tivity to be amplified. Equally, it may be possible to provide a substan-
tive account of the epistemological basis of such virtues which explains
the extent to which they possess objective epistemic warrant. For now,
though, it suffices to show that a role may be played by the cognitive
virtues in ensuring the appropriate application of objective methodolog-
ical norms.
8 Summary and future work
In this paper, I have sought to show how a realist might account for
the epistemic objectivity of science. The stage is set by Kuhn’s idea
that theory-choice is based on shared scientific values and involves both
objective and subjective elements. Because Kuhn provides no epistemo-
logical grounding for the values, they provide at best a minimal form
of objectivity. However, it is possible to define a more robust sense of
objectivity drawing on a normative naturalist conception of the warrant
of methodological norms. Even so, there remains scope for subjective
factors given potential conflict between norms. A role may be played by
cognitive virtues such as impartiality which may import objective factors
into the sphere of the subjective.
Two questions remain to be pursued. The first is the question of the
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relationship between methodological norms and cognitive virtues. One
possibility is that the methodological norms are the primary bearers of
epistemic objectivity. The role of the cognitive virtues in this case is
to play at most a supporting role in the application of the objective
methodological norms. Another possibility is that the cognitive virtues
themselves possess a form of epistemic objectivity in their own right.
They do not just play a supporting role with respect to the method-
ological norms. The virtues themselves embody a form of epistemic
objectivity.
The second question relates to the epistemological grounding of the
cognitive virtues. A unified theory of epistemic objectivity would provide
the same account for the objective warrant of the cognitive virtues as
it does for the methodological norms. The question, then, is whether it
is possible to treat the cognitive virtues in a way that is analogous to
treating the norms of method as truth-conducive tools of inquiry whose
reliability is open to empirical investigation.
These two questions indicate a direction of further inquiry into the
nature of epistemic objectivity from a realist point of view. Much will
turn on the prospects for a naturalistic account of the epistemological
ground of the virtues along the lines of the approach that has been
adopted for the norms of method. Given the track record of naturalism,
there are grounds for optimism in this regard.
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Notes
1 See my [23], for details of this account of scientific realism.
2 That the notion of objectivity is multiply ambiguous is well-known. See, for
example, Douglas [2] for a useful discussion. I do not wish to take issue here with
more fine-grained analyses of the ambiguity. I wish instead to emphasize three
primary forms of objectivity, and to draw attention to a robust form of epistemic
objectivity that is closely associated with epistemic warrant or justification.
3 The ontological form of objectivity relates primarily to inquiry in the natural
sciences in which the objects of study lie outside the mind. It is an interesting
question whether it can be applied to the social sciences which investigate humans
and their mental activity. It can be unproblematically applied to artifacts (e.g.
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tables) which exist in a mind-independent manner despite being made by humans.
But what about minds themselves? Surely, they do not exist independently of
the mental. This raises intriguing metaphysical questions which lie beyond the
scope of the present paper. But note that it makes coherent sense to say that
one may have a mind without believing that one has a mind, or, indeed, having
the concept of a mind at all. An individual’s having a mind is independent of
the mental in that sense. This seems precisely what one should say about some
non-human animals as well as pre-linguistic human children.
4 The correspondence view is a non-epistemic theory of truth which takes truth to
be independent of epistemic notions such as justification. Epistemic theories of
truth which treat truth as an epistemic property risk undermining the objectivity
of truth, since truth in an epistemic sense may depend on variable systems of
belief rather than on a fixed reality outside of belief.
5 The general point about the relationship between epistemic objectivity and the
methodology of science may be put either in terms of a single scientific method
or in terms of a plurality of methods (norms, procedures, etc.). In the next
section, and throughout the remainder of the paper, I approach the issue in more
contemporary fashion in terms of a range of methodological norms rather than a
single scientific method.
6 In addition to [10], which forms the focus of the discussion in this section, Kuhn
makes related points in [13, pp.184-6,198-9] and [9, pp.259-66].
7 Kuhn’s presentation of the scientific values is intended in descriptive spirit as an
enumeration of the values which are and have in fact been employed in scientific
practice in the history of science, as well as in contemporary science.
8 There is, of course, more to incommensurability than this. For details, see my
[18].
9 Scholars may disagree with respect to whether this is a modification or a clari-
fication of Kuhn’s original view. In favour of saying that it is a clarification, it
may be noted that Kuhn does refer at one point in Structure to “commitments
without which no man is a scientist” [13, p.42]. The commitments Kuhn had in
mind might well have been the scientific values which he later enumerates. In
favour of saying that it is a modification, it may be noted that Kuhn did not
explicitly explain what the commitments are in a way that makes clear that they
do include the values.
10 The five values cited in the text are the ones chiefly emphasized by Kuhn. But, as
Hoyningen-Huene notes, other values are mentioned throughout Kuhn’s writings,
e.g. unity of science, explanatory power (see [5, p.149]).
11 A question might be raised about the sense in which the values provide an objec-
tive basis for theory-choice. Because the values are shared among scientists, this
may suggest that they have an intersubjective status rather than being objective.
But it is important to note that the values are keyed to features of actual theories,
e.g., the accuracy of the theory. Because the properties of the theory lie outside
the mind of the scientist they are objective rather than merely intersubjective.
12 Failure to provide a substantive epistemological rationale for the scientific values
is part of a broader pattern. Kuhn never did develop a worked out metamethod-
ological theory of the warrant of epistemic norms, at first flirting with a sociologi-
cal account [13, p.94], later sketching a naturalistic account [9, p.237], and finally
endorsing a conceptual grounding similar in spirit to a Strawsonian justification
of induction [12]. For detailed discussion, see [16, pp.285-97].
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13 Given Kuhn’s resistance to talk of truth in relation to science (e.g. [13, p.205]),
it is perhaps no surprise that he fails to connect the values with truth. Still,
one might suppose that he could have said something about the relation between
values and epistemic justification, since the latter is an important component of
knowledge. On the other hand, how to conceive of knowledge without talking of
truth is problematic. It is worth noting in passing that Kuhn was less reticent
about truth later in his career (e.g. [11, p.99]).
14 For simplicity, I present the approach in terms of truth though scientific real-
ism tends to emphasize approximate truth rather than truth. The position is
characterized as a form of method reliabilism to distinguish it from process reli-
abilism. The processes considered by process reliabilism are typically cognitive
processes with which humans are naturally endowed (e.g. perception, reasoning,
memory). By contrast, methods of the kind at issue here are typically developed
by scientists in the course of scientific practice and are acquired by training and
education. For the distinction between process and method reliabilism, see [4,
pp.93-5].
15 The instrumentalist conception of method is an idea with a strong pragmatist
lineage. The primary inspirations for my approach are the methodological prag-
matism of Rescher [17] and the hypothetical imperative analysis of the rules of
method due to Laudan [15].
16 The account of robust epistemic objectivity that I have sketched in this section
is broadly externalist in spirit. As such, it may attract the ire of those of an
internalist persuasion. For present purposes, there is no need engage in a defence
of reliabilism against internalist critique. The main purpose at hand is to provide
an example of a robust account of objectivity by putting it on display.
17 The existence of a plurality of norms of method raises the specter of epistemic
relativism. One of the strengths of the normative naturalist or method reliabilist
approach is that there is no need to grant to the relativist that one norm is as
good as any other norm. There is an objective difference between norms which
promote truth and norms which do not, so the relativist view that all norms are
of equivalent epistemic status may be rejected. For details of this response to
epistemic relativism, see my [20] and [24].
18 For discussion of the relevant notion of judgement, see my [19], and, for a devel-
oped theory of judgement, see Brown [1].
19 Stump’s article has prompted discussion of the relationship between Duhemian
good sense and empirical considerations in theory choice, as well as alternative
versions of virtue epistemology. See, for example, Ivanova [6, 7] and Kidd [8].
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